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L INTRODUCTION
In recent history, courts have been repeatedly confronted with issues
involving indecency in literature, on the telephone, over the radio, and on
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television. As purveyors of indecent messages, both visual and audio,
become more adept at communicating their messages to an increasing
number of people, much concern has been expressed over those who
inadvertently receive communications of sexually explicit adult material.
Although the target audience of pornography peddlers, and of those entrepreneurs whose products are of a more benign nature, may be mature adults,
there is little question that this target is not always accurately hit.
Children are receiving products and messages from which they should
be protected until such time as they are mature and old enough to legally and
morally decide what they want to see, hear, and do. The majority of distributors of indecent materials are undoubtedly lawful and moral businessmen and entrepreneurs, striving to make a profit by making accessibility to
their products by an adult audience as easy as possible. Amidst this frantic
race for profits, however, sexually explicit materials and messages are often
carelessly distributed by mail, broadcast over airwaves, and transmitted over
telephone wires. The individuals who create these messages are either
ignorant of this budding problem or disinclined to adjust their marketing
practices for fear of economic repercussions. Regardless, the inadvertent
exposure of sexually explicit materials to minors has become a problem of
epidemic proportion, forcing the issue to be confronted by the United States
Supreme Court on more than one occasion.
Few of the Supreme Court decisions regarding indecency offer clear
standards by which to resolve comparable issues. Those cases which are
decided are often done so in terms exclusive to that medium, be it telephone,
radio, or television. This practice of narrowness in Supreme Court decisions
involving First Amendment protection indicates an unwillingness on the part
of the Court to enforce restrictions on specified types of speech in all media.
This reluctance further indicates an inclination by the Court to preserve the
constitutionally protected right to free speech held invaluable by each citizen
of the United States. The downside of this practice is that each subsequent
court that is faced with a First Amendment issue is forced to determine
which bits and pieces of previous decisions are applicable to the situation at
hand and to piece those bits into a coherent decision. Recent decisions,
therefore, often involve incongruous combinations of established doctrine
and modern technology. As a result, the resolution of disputes in this area of
the law are often unpredictable.
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One of the most recent Supreme Court decisions regarding indecency is
DenverArea EducationalTelecommunications Consortium,Inc. v. FCC.' In
this case, a statute authorizing cable operators to prohibit indecent speech
was, challenged by a group of cable programmers and viewers. Part II of this
article will examine recent Supreme Court cases which have confronted
obscenity and indecency, since many of the issues discussed in these cases
reemerge in the context of cable television in Denver. These cases have
defined the terms and established the levels of First Amendment protection
afforded indecent and obscene messages. It is from this foundation that the
United States Supreme Court will derive its principles to analyze the Denver
case. Part III will explain the substance and effect of sections 10(a), 10(b),
and 10(c) of the 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, the Act challenged in Denver. Part IV will follow the case
history of Denver prior to the Supreme Court granting a writ of certiorari.
Part V will examine the decision of the Court, paying careful attention to the
plurality opinion written by Justice Breyer and examining separate opinions
written by Justice. O'Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas, each of
whom differ in their views regarding how this case should have been
decided. Finally, Part VI will argue that, although the plurality attempted to
strike a balance between the protection of children and the exercise of free
speech, it overlooked the most effective and inexpensive means of protecting
children from exposure to indecent cable television programming and may
have inadvertently set the stage for future First Amendment legal battles.
I.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

A. The Threshold of Obscenity: Miller v. California
Before determining the standard by which to regulate indecent materials, the United States Supreme Court was faced with the task of evaluating
the regulation of obscene materials. The threshold determination in deciding
how to prevent inadvertent exposure to obscene materials by children was
defining the term "obscene." This issue was decided by the Supreme Court
in Miller v. California.2 Miller advertised the sale of adult literature by mass
mailing sexually explicit brochures, one of which was received, unsolicited,
by a man and his mother.3 Miller was convicted of violating section 311.2(a)

1. 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
2. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
3. Id. at 16-18.
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of the California Penal Code, which deemed any person distributing obscene
materials through the mail guilty of a misdemeanor.4 The Court began its
analysis in Miller by reaffirming the established tenet that obscene material
is not protected by the First Amendment. 5 Acknowledging the inherent risks
involved in regulating an individual's freedom of expression, the Supreme
Court limited the scope of the regulation to materials which describe or
display sexual conduct only. 6 The Court proceeded to establish guidelines
by which to determine what constitutes obscenity. Among the considerations are: 1) whether an average person applying contemporary community
standards would find the material to have a "prurient appeal;" 2) whether the
material depicts sexual activity in a patently offensive manner; and 3)
whether the material lacks significant literary, cultural, or scientific value.7
Perhaps the most important attribute of obscene materials under this formulation is the degree of prurient content as judged by contemporary community standards. The Court reasoned it would be unrealistic and futile to
attempt to articulate a single standard, given the expansive and diverse
American population. 8 This Miller standard of obscenity impacts future
decisions regarding indecency, including Denver, as it sets forth definitive
guidelines by which to judge constitutionally unprotected materials.

4. ld at 16-17. This section at the time read:
Sending or bringing into state for sale or distribution; printing, exhibiting, distributing or possessing within state "(a) Every person who knowingly: sends or
causes to be sent, or brings or causes to be brought, into this state for sale or distribution, or in this state prepares, publishes, prints, exhibits, distributes, or offers
to distribute, or has, in, his possession with intent to distribute or to exhibit or
offer to distribute, any obscene matter is guilty of a misdemeanor ......
IL See CAL PENAL CODE § 311.2 (1985).
5. Id. at 23 (citing Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1992); United States v. Reidel, 402
U.S. 351, 354 (1971); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)). In Roth, the
Supreme Court upheld a conviction under a federal statute prohibiting the mailing of obscene,
lewd, lascivious, or filthy materials. The opinion stated:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox
ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they
encroach upon the limited area of more important interests. But implicit in the
history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.
Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
6. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23-24.
7. 1a at 24.
8. I1. at 30.
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B. A PervasiveMedium: FCC v. Pacifica Foundation
The regulation of potentially offensive communications was further
examined in the medium of radio broadcasting in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.9 A New York radio station, owned by Pacifica Foundation, aired a
monologue entitled "Filthy Words" during an afternoon broadcast as
performed by comedian George Carlin.'0 A man wrote a letter of complaint
to the FCC a few weeks later, explaining that he and his young son heard the
broadcast and expressing his discontent with the FCC for allowing the
program to be aired.1" In an effort to address growing concerns about
indecent speech over the airwaves, the FCC turned to 18 U.S.C. § 1464,
which provides: "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."'12 The FCC
determined the monologue to be indecent, defining "indecent" as "intimately
connected with the exposure of children to language that describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for
the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of
the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience."13 Utilizing many of the same terms used to define obscenity in
Miller, the FCC implemented a community based standard by which to judge
indecency. This definition was tailored to protect children from indecent
broadcasts to the greatest extent possible. Recognizing the possibility of its
order violating the First Amendment, the FCC issued an opinion following
its declaration of the monologue as indecent. The FCC stated that it never
intended to absolutely prohibit indecent broadcasts, but rather it sought to
reduce the risk of exposure to children by channeling that type of program4
ming into time periods when children are least likely to be listening.'
In determining the broadcast to be indecent, the FCC identified several
words and phrases in the monologue that repeatedly described sexual and

9. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
10. Id. at 729. Carlin's monologue began: "I was thinking about the curse words and the
swear words, the cuss words and the words that you can't say, that you're not supposed to say
all the time, [']cause words or people into words want to hear your words." Id. at 751. He
proceeded to repeat curse words over and over, using them in different contexts and as
colloquialisms.
11. Id at 730.
12. Id. at731. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464(1976).
13. Pacifica,438 U.S. at 731-32.
14. IdL at 732-33.
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excretory activity. 15 Furthermore, the broadcast was aired in the afternoon
when children were likely to be listening, therefore making the broadcast
patently offensive and indecent.' 6 Pacifica Foundation conceded the
broadcast was patently offensive but argued the broadcast was not indecent
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1464, claiming the term "indecent" is
synonymous with "obscene.' 1 7 The essential element of "obscenity," and
thus "indecency," under Pacifica's reasoning, is prurient appeal.' 8 Upon
examining the text of the monologue, it is apparent no such prurient appeal
exists. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, however, noting the
language of 18 U.S.C § 1464 prohibits "obscene, indecent, or profane"
language, implying each phrase was meant by Congress to be construed
separately. 19
The Court further determined the statute was not overbroad because it
was issued in a specific, factual context, which is an important consideration
when reviewing the regulation of indecent communications.2" The Court
explained 'that radio broadcasting has received the most limited constitutional protection of all media thus far, justifying this limitation in the context
Broadcasting, stated the Court, has
of the broadcasting medium. 2'
in the lives of all Americans.' 2 2
presence
"established a uniquely pervasive
This pervasiveness is so great that citizens, including children, may be
subjected to unexpected indecent programming while listening at home due
to the tendency of listeners to tune in and out.23 Section 1464 was subsequently deemed a constitutionally permissible method of regulating the
broadcasting medium.
C. Narrowingthe Means: Sable Communications of California, Inc.
v. FCC
More recently, the Supreme Court decided the constitutionality of
section 223(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended in 1988,

15. Id. at 739.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 739-40.
18. Pacifica,438 U.S. at 739.
19. Id. at 739-40.
20. Id. at 742. The Court justified this method by explaining that "indecency is largely a
function of context-it cannot be adequately judged in the abstract." Id.
21. Id. at 748. The Court explained that a broadcaster may have his license revoked if it
would serve the "public interest, convenience, and necessity." Pacifica,438 U.S. at 748.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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which imposed an outright ban on indecent and obscene interstate commercial telephone messages. 24 This issue was decided in Sable Communications
of California,Inc. v. FCC.25 Sable operated a dial-a-porn business offering
prerecorded sexually explicit phone messages. Sable sought to enjoin the
FCC from prosecuting the company under section 223(b).
The Court began its opinion by reiterating the message that First
Amendment protection does not protect obscene speech.26 The Court
proceeded to reject Sable's contention that section 223(b) attempts to
mandate a national standard of obscenity in violation of the "community
standards" requirement established in Miller.27 The Court asserted that, in
light of this varying standard, Sable would have had to bear the costs of
conforming its interstate messages to local community standards if it sought
to continue providing obscene messages. The Court declined to determine
whether the messages provided by Sable were, in fact, obscene, but rather
attempted to determine whether Congress
may prohibit those messages,
28
whether viewed to be indecent or obscene.
In order for Congress to permissibly restrict this type of speech, it must
first demonstrate it is attempting to further a compelling government interest.
The Court identified the compelling interest that was being served by the
statute as the "physical and psychological well-being of minors." 29 While
this interest is compelling, to withstand strict scrutiny, the statute must also
be narrowly drawn and designed to serve this compelling interest without
unnecessarily interfering with the exercise of the First Amendment.30 In
support of the statute, the government argued that a total ban on indecent
telephone messages was justified because it was the least restrictive means
of preventing children from gaining access to those messages. 31 The Court
rejected the argument that alternatives to an outright ban, such as credit
cards, access codes, and scrambling devices, would not effectively promote

24. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1988).
25. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
26. Id. at 124.
27. Id. at 124-25. In Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), the Court stated:
"The fact that distributors of allegedly obscene materials may be subjected to varying
community standards in the various federal judicial districts into which they transmit the
materials does not render a federal statute unconstitutional because of a failure of application
of uniform national standards of obscenity." Id. at 106.
28. Sable, 492 U.S. at 124.
29. Id. at 126.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 128.
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the compelling interest, noting that no evidence had been presented to
support this conclusion.3 2 The statute therefore denied adult access to
indecent phone messages in a manner which far exceeded the precautions
33
necessary to protect children from receiving those messages.
In an attempt to support the validity of the statute, the government cited
Pacifica as an example of the Supreme Court upholding the regulation of
indecent programming. The Court rejected this comparison, noting that the
Pacifica Court emphasized the narrowness of that decision. The Court
further differentiated between the contexts of the two decisions. Pacifica
did not involve a total ban on indecent broadcasting. Rather, the FCC
wanted to broadcast indecent programming during time periods that would
be less likely to promote exposure to children. 34 Section 223(b), meanwhile,
mandated an outright ban on the dial-a-porn service. In addition, the media
of broadcasting and telephone communications inherently differ in degrees
of pervasiveness. Whereas radio broadcasting is extremely pervasive and
intrudes into the privacy of the home, making a telephone call involves an
affirmative action, thus reducing the risk that an unwilling or underage caller
35
might accidentally be exposed to sexually explicit messages.
I1. REGULATING THE CABLE TELEVISION MEDIUM

A. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
Cable television channels originated in the late 1960s, as cable operators received franchises from local governments. As the cable industry
grew, Congress enacted the Cable Communications Policy Act in 1984 in an
effort to "promote competition in the delivery of diverse sources of video

32. Id. at 128-29. The lack of evidence supporting this conclusion was due to the fact
that the FCC implemented these safeguards in 1988, and the effects of these measures have
not yet been calculated. Sable, 492 U.S. at 128.
33. Id. at 131. Justice White, delivering the opinion of the court, described the effect of
section 223(b) as another case of "bum[ing] the house to roast the pig." Id. (quoting Butler v.
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
34. Pacifica,438 U.S. at 733.
35. Sable, 492 U.S. at 127-28. The Court addressed inadvertent exposure by children to
indecent programming, stating: "Unlike an unexpected outburst on a radio broadcast, the
message received by one who places a call to a dial-a-porn service is not so invasive or
surprising that it prevents an unwilling listener from avoiding exposure to it." Id. at 128. In
regards to children who intentionally seek out those messages, the Court conceded: "It may
well be that there is no fail-safe method of guaranteeing that never will a minor be able to
access the dial-a-porn system." Id. at 130.
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programming and to assure that the widest possible diversity of information
sources are made available to the public ....
,36 The Act required the cable
operators to set aside a certain number of channels, depending upon the total
number of channels available in that area, for commercial lease by unaffiliated third parties.3 7 These channels reserved fori private parties became
known as leased access channels. The Act further permitted local governments to require operators to set aside certain channels for "public, educational, or governmental use." 38 These channels became known as public
access channels. 39 When Congress initially enacted the Act, it forbade cable
operators from regulating programming on both leased access and public
access channels. 40

B. The Cable Television Consumer Protectionand CompetitionAct of
1992
Years later, Congress confronted what it believed to be a serious threat
to the well-being of the American public. Senator Jesse Helms of North
Carolina explained "that cable companies are required by law to carry, on
leased access channels, any and every program that comes along-no matter
how offensive and disgusting." 4' These programs often included indecent
material of a sexually explicit nature. Congress was concerned that "early
and sustained exposure to hard core pornography can result in significant
physical, psychological, and social damage to a child. 42

36. 47 U.S.C. § 532(a) (Supp. V 1988).
37. 47 U.S.C. § 532(b) (1988). The terms of section 532 require cable operators with 36
or more channels to designate 10% for commercial lease and 55 or more channels to designate
15%. Id. Cable operators with fewer than 36 active channels are exempt from these
requirements. Id.
38. See 47 U.S.C. § 531 (1988).
39. Public access channels are also called PEG channels.
40. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 531(e), 532(c)(2).
41. 138 CONG. REC. S646 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992) (statement of Sen. Helms). Senator
Helms continued: "The end result is perverted and disgusting programs mixed with religious
and health shows. These leased access channels were intended to promote diversity, but
instead they promote perversity." Id.
42. 138 CONG. REC. S649 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992) (statement of Sen. Coats). In support
of this correlation, Senator Coats referred to the sexually exploited child unit of the Los
Angeles Police Department who have "long known that pornography is often employed by
offenders in the extrafamilial sexual victimization of children." Senator Coats also cited a
study conducted by Dr. Zillman of Indiana University, in which pornography was reported to
promote the victimization of women and a more lenient view of rape and bestiality. Id.
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In response to the growing threat to American children, Congress
enacted sections 10(a), 10(b), and 10(c) of the 1992 Cable Communication
Policy Act ("Cable Act"). Section 10(a) of the Cable Act permitted cable
operators to enforce "a written and published policy of prohibiting programming that the cable operator reasonably believes describes or depicts
sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner as
measured by contemporary community standards" on leased access channels. 43 Section 10(b) required cable operators who permit indecent programming on leased access channels to place the programming on a separate
channel and to block a subscriber's access to that channel until the subscriber requests in writing that the channel be unblocked. 44 The plague of
indecent programming was not limited to leased access channels. Section
10(c) further permitted cable operators to prohibit the use of public access
channels for any programming which contained obscene material, sexually
explicit conduct, or material soliciting or promoting unlawful conduct. 45 The
section concerning public access channels was not accompanied by a
segregate and block requirement for those indecent programs the operator
chooses not to ban. 46
IV. JuDIcIAL HISTORY OF DENVER AREA EDUCATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS CONSORTIUM, INC. V. FCC
A. Alliance for Community Media v. FCC: The PanelDecision
In Alliance for Community Media v. FCC,47 four groups of cable
programmers, listeners, and viewers petitioned for review of sections 10(a),
10(b), and 10(c) of the Cable Act. The petitioners were individually comprised of representatives from: 1) Alliance for Community Media, Alliance
for Communications Democracy, and People for the American Way; 2)
Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium; 3) American
Civil Liberties Union; and 4) New York Citizens Committee for Responsible
Media, and Media Access New York, Brooklyn Producers' Group. Each
filed suit seeking review of the statute. The four petitions were consolidated

43. 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (Supp. V 1988).
44. Id. § 5320).
45. Id. § 531.
46. Id.
47. 10 F.3d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Alliance 1], cert. granted, Denver Area
Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 471 (1995), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
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and heard by a panel consisting of three United States Court of Appeals
judges on September 14, 1993. The panel identified two primary constitutional issues that could be extrapolated from the case. First, when the
government passes a law requiring cable operators to reserve a certain
number of access channels for general use without regard to content, may the
government then constitutionally permit cable operators to prohibit indecent
programming from being televised? 48 Second, if cable operators do not
exercise their power to ban indecent programming, may the government
require the cable operator to segregate and block indecent programming on
access channels? 49 The panel rejected the government's argument that the
statute authorizing cable operators to ban indecent programming does not
implicate the First Amendment because no state action exists. 50 The government claimed that the action is being performed by private individuals,
namely the cable operators, and not the government. 51 The panel asserted
that a private individual may be subject to First Amendment scrutiny if the
state significantly encourages the private individuals to commit the act in
question.52 The panel determined that sections 10(a) and 10(c) constituted
on the part of the government and
an adequate amount of encouragement
53
action.
state
involved
therefore
The panel then turned to the sections of the Cable Act themselves to
determine what level of scrutiny should apply. Sections 10(a) and 10(c)
attempt to regulate and prohibit programming based solely on whether that
programming may be deemed indecent. These sections were therefore

48. Id. at 816.
49. Id. at 817.

50. Id. at 818.
51. ld.
52. Alliance I, 10 F.3d at 818. In support of this assertion, the panel cited Franz v.
United States, 707 F.2d 582, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1983), in which the court held that the government's encouragement, through the witness protection program, of a mother's decision to keep

children away from their father constituted state action. Id. The Franzcourt stated:
It is clear that the defendants, by accepting Catherine and the children into
the program along with Allen, are largely responsible for the success of Cather-

ine's effort to deny William access to his offspring. Without the aid of the ad-

ministrators of the program in providing her with a new identity, Catherine almost certainly would not have been able to frustrate William's attempts to exer-

cise and enforce his visitation rights; with that aid, she has been able to act with
impunity.

Id. at 591-92.
53. Alliance 1, 10 F.3d at 818.
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interpreted by the court as content-based restrictions on free speech.54 The
restrictions may have been constitutionally permissible, however, if the
means promoted a compelling55interest and constituted the least restrictive
means to promote that interest.
The protection of children from indecent materials has long been
recognized by the court as a compelling interest.5 6 The panel was not
convinced, however, that sections 10(a) and 10(c) provided the least restrictive means to promote this interest. The total denial of access to indecent
material, a ban which would affect children and adults alike, could result in
the adult television viewing population receiving only programming that is
fit for children.57 The panel further pointed to the fact that Congress has
provided a less restrictive means to promote its objective within the text of
the Cable Act itself. 58 The panel asserted that by providing the cable
operator with the choice of either totally banning indecent programming or
segregating that programming to a separate channel and blocking it, Congress has suggested that there may exist a less restrictive but completely
adequate alternative to an outright ban.59 Sections 10(a) and 10(c), therefore, did not constitute the least restrictive means of promoting a compelling
interest and did not withstand strict scrutiny by the panel.
While analyzing section 10(b), the panel pointed out that a restriction
on speech may not "single out a class of speakers on the basis of criteria that
are wholly unrelated to the interest sought to be advanced.,, 60 The panel
determined that leased access channels were being singled out and regulated
in such a manner, while other commercial channels were left relatively
undisturbed. 6' This discrepancy was unacceptable. Nonetheless, the panel

54. Id. at 822-23.
55. Id. at 823 (citing Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126
(1989)).
56. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989); New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
57. Alliance I, 10 F.3d at 823 (citing Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
58. Id. at 823-24.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 825. The panel drew an analogy between this case and City of Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993), in which the removal of commercial newsstands for the purpose of promoting safety and aesthetics was found to violate the First
Amendment because noncommercial news racks causing the same problems remained
unregulated. Id. at 430-31.
61. Alliance 1, 10 F.3d at 826.
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declined to strike down the section, choosing instead to remand it to the FCC
to justify this preferential treatment. 62
B. Alliance for Community Media v. FCC: The En Banc Decision
In reviewing the panel decision, the United States Court of Appeals,
sitting en banc, determined that the constitutionality of sections 10(a) and
10(c) turned on the absence or presence of state action. 63 While acknowledging that sections 10(a) and 10(c) promoted cable operators' free speech
by empowering them with greater editorial control, the court questioned how
these same sections impair the petitioners' freedom of speech. 64 The court
viewed the power struggle between cable operators and programmers as an
inherent characteristic of cable television. The more discretion a cable
operator has over what programs will be aired, the less power the programmer has to choose what programs to air.65 The court argued that to hold that
the restoration of editorial control that has resulted from the enactment of the
statute is automatically state action would cripple Congress' ability to
correct previous mistakes and prevent Congress from attempting to regulate
for good cause. 66 Furthermore, section 10(a) does not mandate the prohibition of indecent programming. Rather it gives cable operators a choice. In
the eyes of the court, the regulations prescribed by the Cable Act are not an
exercise of governmental authority but are instead an empowerment of
individual discretion. The court determined that this empowerment did not
constitute state action and the section did not warrant First Amendment

62. Id. at 831.
63. Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
[hereinafter Alliance II], cert. granted, Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 471 (1995), aff'd in part andrev'd in part, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
64. Id. at 114. The court used stronger language to characterize the petitioners' position,
stating that "petitioners are merely complaining about section 10(a)'s and section 10(c)'s
restoring to cable operators' their option to reject indecent programming on their cable
systems." Id.
65. Id. at 115.

66. Id. During the debates over the Cable Television Consumer Protection Act, Senator
Helmes addressed the ability of Congress to correct its own mistakes by stating:
Congress undoubtedly meant well in requiring cable operators to operate public
and leased access channels as a public forum open to any and all speakers. Even
in a "traditional public forum" [e.g., a public street], however,.., the privacy of
the home is at stake. If Congress is serious about correcting abuses in the provision of cable television programming, it cannot continue to ignore the problem of
pornographic programming on public and leased access channels.
138 CONG. REc. S648 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992) (statement of Sen. Helms).
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protection. 67 Sections 10(a) and 10(c), consequently, were upheld in their
entirety.
In analyzing section 10(b), the court turned to principles established in
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation and FCC v. Sable Communications of California. From these cases, the court derived two applicable tenets: 1) the
constitutionality of regulating indecent programming is dependent upon a
medium's characteristics; and 2) the government must strive to accommodate both the interest of society by limiting children's exposure to indecent
materials and the interest of adults who choose to obtain and utilize those
materials. 68 Cable television programming is similar to radio broadcasts in
many aspects, noted the court. 69 Both media are incapable of maintaining an
adequate early warning system that would alert the audience of upcoming
indecent programming, due to the constant tuning in and out of the listeners
and viewers. 70 In addition, both radio broadcasts and leased access channels
come automatically into the home of the audience, without additional
subscription or request beyond what is already present in most homes. 7' For
these reasons, the court determined that alternative methods of protecting
children from indecent broadcasts, such as airing indecent programs late at
night or viewer controlled channel blocking systems, do not adequately
combat the pervasiveness of the cable television medium.72 Thus, the court
determined that section 10(b) was the least restrictive means to achieve the
established compelling government interest 73 and therefore, withstood strict
scrutiny.
In response to petitioners' allegation that section 10(b)'s segregate and
block system discriminates against leased access channels, the court pointed
out that little would change from the perspective of the viewer if section
10(b) were implemented. The only difference is that prior to the Cable Act,
indecent programming was broadcast into the subscriber's home unless it

67. Alliance II, 56 F.3d at 123.
68. Id. at 124.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. Justice Randolph, writing the opinion, portrayed the unwary cable subscriber as
analogous to the motorists in Pacifica by stating that "[a] cable subscriber no more asks for
such programming than did the offended listener in Pacifica who turned on his radio."
Alliance II, 56 F.3d at 124.
72. Id. at 125. The court denounces two alternatives, voluntary blocking systems and
lock boxes, stating the former are certain to cause a programmer error due to the constant
maintenance required, and the latter would block leased access programming altogether. Id.
73. Id.
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was affirmatively blocked out. 74 Under section 10(b), the indecent programming is not broadcast into the subscriber's home unless it is affirmatively invited in. Therefore, the court decided that no discrimination was
being perpetrated through section 10(b) of the Cable Act.
The court rejected the petitioners' argument that section 10(b)'s
allowance of a thirty day period in which the cable operator must unblock a
segregated channel at the subscriber's request constituted a prior restraint on
free speech.7 6 The programming will air eventually, reasoned the court, and
the subscriber has no basis to demand immediate unblocking. 77 The court
analogized this waiting period to that often endured while waiting for cable
television to be initially hooked up in one's home, asserting that both of
these waiting periods are completely acceptable.78 The court finally rejected
the petitioners' claim that section 10(b) is void for vagueness because it
defers responsibility to the leased access programmer to determine which
programs are indecent, thereby providing no definitive standard to identify
those programs affected by the Cable Act.79 The court found that the FCC
definition was similar to the subjective standard established in Pacifica and
adequately sets forth an acceptable guideline that would aid the programmer
in making that determination.80 The court determined that section 10(b)
satisfied the least restrictive means test, did not single out leased access
channels for regulation, did not constitute a prior restraint on free speech,
and was not void for vagueness. Section 10(b) was consequently deemed
constitutional, and all of the sections in question were found consistent with
the Constitution by -the United States Court of Appeals.
V. DENVER AREA EDUCATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS CONSORTIUM,
INC. V. FCC
A. Justice Breyer: Setting a New Standard
Two of the cases challenging the Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992, Denver Area Educational Telecommunica-

74. Id. at 126.
75. Alliance II, 56 F.3d at 126.
76. Id. at 128.

77. Id.
78. Id. The court admonished that "[s]ubscribers wishing to see indecent speech may not
have their wishes fulfilled instantaneously .... " Id.
79. Alliance II, 56 F.3d at 129.

80. Id.
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tions Consortium, Inc. v. FCC and Alliance for Community Media v. FCC,
were consolidated and heard by the United States Supreme Court as Denver
Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC.81 Justice
Breyer wrote a plurality opinion concerning sections 10(a) and 10(c), and a
majority opinion concerning section 10(b). Turning first to section 10(a),
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens, Justice O'Connor, and Justice
Souter, (the "Breyer Group"), believed the threshold determination in
deciding whether section 10(a) violated the First Amendment to be whether
the action being scrutinized could be considered state action.8 2 The United
States Court of Appeals found no state action being perpetrated by section
10(a), citing an insufficiently close nexus between the government action
and the cable operators to make such a determination.8 3
The plurality overturned the Court of Appeals finding that section 10(a)
does not constitute state action but rather reaffirms the authority of the
individual cable operators to exercise their choice of programming.8 4 Cable
operators are intertwined with government, argued Justice Breyer, as they
exist with government permission and utilize government facilities, i.e.
streets and rights of way, to string and lay cables.85 In addition, most
communities are served by only one cable system operator.86 If the sections
in question were upheld, cable operators could conceivably yield a great
amount of censorship power, as there usually are no alternatives for cable87
viewers who could be subject to the editorial whims of the cable operator.
According to Justice Breyer, these characteristics establish the action of
cable operators as a government function.
Freedom of speech is a constitutionally protected right. The essence of
that right, according to Justice Breyer, "is that Congress may not regulate
speech except in cases of extraordinary need and with the exercise of a
degree of care that we have not elsewhere required. 8 Justice Breyer noted,
however, that the Court's interpretation of this protection has not rendered

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
Id. at 2382.
Alliance II, 56 F.3d at 113.
Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2382-83.
Id. at 2383.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2384.
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either Congress or the states powerless to address societal problems.8 9 In the
plurality opinion, Justice Breyer discussed at length the necessity for
flexibility while evaluating First Amendment protection cases. Although
several analogies existed between this case and other cases involving the
communication media, the Breyer group refused to accept an immutable
standard by which to judge all such questions of constitutionality. 90 Rather,
the question as posed by Justice Breyer was whether section 10(a) addressed
"an extremely important problem, without imposing, in light of the relevant
interests, an unnecessarily great restriction on speech." 91
Justice Breyer acknowledged that the issue addressed by this case is
extremely important and is one that "this Court has often found compelling-the need to protect children from exposure to patently offensive sex9 3 for example, the
related material."92 In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,
Supreme Court upheld the prohibition by the FCC of an indecent broadcast
by a radio station, finding that such a prohibition did not violate the station's
First Amendment rights. 94 Justice Breyer identified several similarities
between Pacifica and Denver: 1) the accessibility of both media to children;
2) the pervasiveness of both media in the lives of the American public; 3) the
lack of warning prior to the broadcast of indecent material; and 4) the
availability of such materials on tapes and records and at theaters and
nightclubs.95
As public media, both radio and television are easily accessible to
adults and children. A minuscule number of American homes are without a
television, and a large number of those with television are subscribers to

89. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2384 (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978);
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942)).
90. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2385. Justice Breyer believed the tradition of the First Amendment "embodies an overarching commitment to protect speech from Government regulation
through close judicial scrutiny, thereby enforcing the Constitution's constraints, but without
imposing judicial formulae so rigid that they become a straightjacket that disables Government
from responding to serious problems." Id.
91. Id.at 2385.
92. Id. at 2386 (citing Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126
(1989); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
639-40 (1968)).
93. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
94. I& at 750.

95. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2386-87.
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cable programming. 96 Furthermore, the technology of cable television is
user-friendly, as small children can easily turn it on and off. As previously
noted, George Carlin's monologue in Pacifica was aired at about two
o'clock in the afternoon by a New York radio station and was heard by a
motorist and his young son.97 This occurrence was illustrative to the court of
common listening practices and was one factor that influenced the Court's
decision to regulate programming. The Court reasoned:
Because the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out,
prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer
from unexpected program content. To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like saying98 that the remedy for an assault is to run away
after the first blow.
The listening habits of the audience added an additional degree of difficulty
in protecting listeners from unwanted material in Pacifica. In a similar
analysis, Justice Breyer concluded that cable viewers sample more channels
than viewers without cable television before watching a program for a
sustained period of time, making them even more susceptible to inadvertently viewing unwanted and indecent programming."
Justice Breyer further evaluated section 10(a) in light of the ban in
Pacifica, finding it less restrictive than the latter, and therefore constitutional
in light of case precedent. Section 10(a) is permissive and allows cable
operators a certain degree of flexibility. 1°° This section does not order an
outright ban but rather allows the cable operators to reschedule certain
programs to serve the needs of its adult viewing audience, while protecting
its younger viewers.'(' Although cable operators retain the discretion to ban
indecent programming, they may or may not choose to do so. Justice Breyer
noted:
[T]he same may be said of Pacifica'sban. In practice, the FCC's
daytime broadcast ban could have become a total ban, depending
upon how private operators (programmers, station owners, net96. Id. Nearly 56,000,000 homes, more than 60% off all homes with television, have
cable (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 862, 102d Cong. 2d Sess. 56 (1984)).
97. Pacifica,438 U.S. at 729-30.
98. Id. at 748-49.
99. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2386-87.
100. Id. at 2387.
101. Id.
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works) responded to it. They would have had to decide whether to
reschedule the daytime show for nighttime broadcast in light of
comparative audience demand and a host of other practical factors
that similarly would
determine the practical outcomes of the provi12
sions before us. 0
The result is that the uncertainty as to the "practical consequences" of both

regulations makes it difficult to determine whether the regulation imposed by
section 10(a) of the Cable Act is any more severe than the FCC order in
Pacifica.10 3 This similarity. with the Pacifica ban was one factor convincing
the Breyer Group of section 10(a)'s constitutional validity.
The petitioners also argued that section 10(a) is unconstitutional
because of the public forum doctrine. "Public forums" are places which
have been created by the government for use by the public as a forum for
expressive and creative activity. 1°4 In a public forum, "all parties have a
constitutional right of access and the State must demonstrate compelling
reasons for restricting access to a single class of speakers, a single viewpoint, or a single subject." 10 5 The government's reasoning, therefore, was
that leased access channels are public forums, as they have been opened up
for use by the public for television programming. The petitioners added
"that the statute's permissive provisions unjustifiably exclude material, on
the basis of content, from the 'public forum' that the government has created
in the form of access channels." 1°6

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). Perry
characterizes public forums as "places which by long tradition or government fiat have been
devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the State to limit expressive activity are sharply
circumscribed." Id. at 45. The Perry Court continued:
In a public forum, by definition, all parties have a constitutional right of access
and the State must demonstrate compelling reasons for restricting access to a single class of speakers, a single viewpoint, or a single subject.
When speakers and subjects are similarly situated, the State may not pick and
choose. Conversely on government property... not all speech is equally situated, and the State may draw distinctions which relate to the special purpose for
which the property is used. As we have explained above, for a school mail facility, the difference in status between the exclusive bargaining representative and
its rival is such a distinction.
Id. at 55.
105. Id.
106. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2388.
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Justice Breyer rejected the application of the public forum doctrine to
this case. °7 First, claimed Justice Breyer, the public forum doctrine should
08
not be "imported wholesale into the area of common carriage regulation."'
Throughout the plurality opinion, Justice Breyer displayed reluctance to
analogize between this case and different areas of the law. The evolving and
expanding state of the telecommunications field, reasoned Breyer, hinders
the application of previously developed doctrines to such a changing
arena.' 09 The public forum doctrine is further inapplicable, as the public
forum "is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the
facility."' 10 The parameters of a public forum have not yet been defined,
added Justice Breyer, noting:
Our cases have not yet determined, however, that the Government's decision to dedicate a public forum to one type of content
or another is necessarily subject to this highest level of scrutiny.
Must a local government, for example, show a compelling state interest if it builds a band shell in the park and dedicates it solely
to
1
classical music (but not to jazz)? The answer is not obvious.
The public forum doctrine, therefore, even if applicable, would not automatically render section 10(a) constitutional.
Rather than address these potentially problematic issues, Justice Breyer
decided that the Court need not necessarily address the public forum issue to
resolve this case. 1 2 This is because:
[T]he effects of Congress' decision on the interests of programmers, viewers, cable operators, and children are the same, whether
we characterize Congress' decision as one that limits access to a
public forum, discriminates in common carriage, or constrains
speech because of its content. If we consider this particular limitation of indecent television programming acceptable as a constraint
on speech, we must no less accept the limitation it places on
access
13
to the claimed public forum or on use of common carrier."

107. Id.

108. Id. at 2389.
109. i at 2388-89.

110. Id at 2389 (quoting Perry,460 U.S. at 46).
111. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2389.

112. M at 2388.
113. IdMat 2389.
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According to the Breyer Group, this issue need not be decided in terms
related to the public forum doctrine. 1 4 Justice Breyer stated that "the
government's interest in protecting children, the 'permissive' aspect of the
statute, and the nature of the medium," sufficiently justifies upholding
section 10(a) of the Cable
Act, and the "label" under which this case is
15
decided is irrelevant.'
Finally, Justice Breyer rejected the petitioners' argument that the
section's definition of indecent materials is void for vagueness, as it grants
too much editorial authority to the cable operator." 6 A statute is void for
vagueness if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application.' 17 Section 10(a) does provide a
significant degree of leeway, as it permits cable operators to prohibit
"programming that the cable operator reasonably believes describes or
depicts sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive
manner as measured by contemporary community standards."'" 8 Justice
Breyer found this definition to be similar to that used in Miller v. California,119 in which obscene material was defined in terms of:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest ... (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken
as a 1whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value. 20
The Breyer Group found that each of these regulations are "vague," in the
sense that they offer no strict guidelines by which to judge obscenity and
indecency but rather fit into "the category of materials that Justice Stewart

114. Id.

115. Id
116. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2390.
117. Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). The Court explained:
[Tihe terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit
to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them
liable to its penalties, is a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law.
Mdat 391.
118. 47 U.S.C. § 532(h).
119. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
120. Id. at 24.
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thought could be described only in terms of 'I know it when I see it."",12 1 The
identification of these materials therefore depends in large part on degree,
context, and time. 221 Justice Breyer therefore decided that the "vagueness,"
which the petitioners fault as rendering section 10(a) unconstitutional, is a
necessary lack of strict guidelines that must be accepted when evaluating
materials of this kind.
The Breyer Group further argued that the "vagueness" of section 10(a)
further protects against overbroad application by permitting cable operators
to ban programming only pursuant to a written policy drawn up by the cable
operator.'2 This section provides some degree of uniformity, as it required
the identical application of the policy to all programs, thus24diminishing the
threat of arbitrary censorship by misguided cable operators.
The Breyer Group then justified the qualifier within the statute which
allows the cable operator to prohibit programming which he "reasonably
believes" to be indecent. This qualifier, claimed Justice Breyer, is designed
not to expand the category of programming affected by the statute, but rather
to provide some degree of justification for an honest, good faith mistake by
the cable operator.1 5 Section 10(a), therefore, was not rendered unconstitutional for vagueness by the plurality.
Justice Breyer was joined by Justice Stevens, Justice O'Connor, Justice
Kennedy, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsberg in a majority opinion which
found section 10(b) unconstitutional. Section 10(b) constitutes a significantly more aggressive attack on indecent cable television programming.
Whereas section 10(a) permitted cable operators to block indecent programming, section 10(b) requires cable operators to segregate "patently offensive" sexually explicit programming to a particular channel and to block that
channel.126 The channel may be unlocked only by a written request from the
cable subscriber. 27 In addition, leased access channel programmers would
be required to notify cable operators of upcoming programming considered

121. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2390 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring)).
122. Id.
123. 47 U.S.C. § 532(h).
124. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2390.
125. Id. The Court further claimed the reasonableness section constrains the cable operator as much as it protects them. An operator would have difficulty proving an exercise of
discretion was reasonable, if a similar exercise had been deemed unreasonable by an earlier
court decision. Id.
126. 47 U.S.C. § 532(j).
127. Id.
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patently offensive thirty days prior to air time. 128 The government argued
that this "segregate and block" policy is constitutional because it provides
the least restrictive means of addressing a compelling interest, this being
"the physical and psychological well-being of minors." 129 Justice Breyer
rejected this argument, finding
section 10(b) to be much more extensive and
13
restrictive than necessary. 0
In support of this, the majority observed that current methods of
protecting children from inadvertent exposure to indecent programming
already exist and are much less intrusive into adult viewing practices.
Among the current methods are the requirement of cable operators to
scramble programming on channels "primarily dedicated to sexuallyoriented programming,"' 13 the ability of any cable subscriber to have
channels blocked at their request, and the application of the V-chip which,
when installed in a television, automatically blocks excessively violent or
1 32
sexual programs.
Justice Breyer further questioned how section 10(b) is less restrictive
than a phone call based system which would block channels by subscriber
request, when in fact each method would achieve the same end, the protection of younger viewers from adult-oriented programming. 33 Therefore,
section 10(b) imposed an unnecessarily great restriction on free speech and
was struck down by the majority.
Finally, Justice Breyer was joined by Justice Stevens and Justice Souter
in a plurality opinion finding section 10(c) unconstitutional. The final
section challenged, section 10(c), is similar in content to section 10(a), as it
also permitted the cable operator to block offensive programming. Section
10(c), however, was directed at public access channels, whereas section
10(a) affects only leased access channels. Justice Breyer observed that
public access channels have generally been reserved to the city that has
awarded the cable franchise to a particular cable operator as partial consideration for the franchise.1 34 The cable operators have historically had very
little editorial control over the content of public access channel programming. 135 These channels have usually been managed by various private and
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2391.
Id.
Id at 2392.
Id.
Id.
Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2394.
Id.
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public entities, often composed of community leaders and sponsors. The
result of these characteristics, according to the Breyer Group, is that section
10(c) did not restore any power to the cable operator over public access
programming.' 36 This is because very little power, if any, ever resided
within the cable operator regarding public access channel programs.
Justice Breyer also noted that there already exists a policing agency
over public access programming, usually a supervising board or government
access manager. 137 This agency would likely monitor the content of programming and avoid airing offensive programming when easily accessible to
children. 138 The function of the cable operator as a gatekeeper to offensive
materials would, therefore, be redundant, as that function is already being
performed by the governmental agency in control of the public access
channel. The Breyer Group feared that by empowering the cable operator to
decide which programs are not offensive when the interests of the children
are already being safeguarded, there was a risk that programming
which
39
could be considered "borderline" could be prevented from airing.'
As a result of the preceding analysis, section 10(a) was found constitutional, and sections 10(b) and 10(c) were deemed unconstitutional. In
rendering its final judgment, the plurality had to consider whether sections
10(a), 10(b), and 10(c) were severable, or whether the three sections were to
be interpreted as an inseparable package, all or none of which must pass or
fail. In making this determination, the Breyer Group looked to the legislative intent of Congress and asked whether Congress would still have passed
section 10(a) had it known the other two sections would be struck down.' 4°
The Breyer Group felt that sections 10(a) and 10(c) clearly stand alone, as
each deals with a 1separate
type of cable channel, specifically leased access
4
1
access.
public
and
Sections 10(a) and 10(b) have a tighter nexus. Section 10(b) requires
the cable operator who was exercising his right under section 10(a) to either
ban offensive programming or segregate and block it. 142 Absent section
10(b), cable operators would be afforded greater discretion over programming deemed patently offensive. Justice Breyer alleged that by striking
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2395.
139. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2395. The Court notes this misuse could occur either from the
use or threatened use of the cable operator's veto power. Id.
140. Id. at 2397.
141. Id.
142. 47 U.S.C. § 532(j).
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down section 10(b), the majority may have promoted the exercise of free
speech, as the cable operator will no longer have to bear the cost of segregating and blocking channels which they decide not to ban, increasing the
likelihood that the operator will choose to ban fewer programs.' 43 Thus,
given Congress' stated objective, there was no basis for Justice Breyer to
conclude Congress would have preferred no regulation as compared to
section 10(a) alone. 44 Section 10(a) was therefore severable and deemed
constitutionally valid by the plurality.
B. Justice O'Connor:Keeping an Eye on the Children
Justice O'Connor agreed with the plurality opinion that section 10(a)
was constitutionally valid and section 10(b) was not. 45 Justice O'Connor
disagreed with the majority decision striking down section 10(c) in spite of
several similarities between sections 10(a) and 10(c); similarities which she
believed warranted upholding section 10(c) for the same reasons which
required a finding that section 10(a) was constitutional.' 4" Both sections
attempt to serve a vital interest, the protection of children from indecent
materials; both sections are permissive as neither mandate an outright ban of
indecent programming but rather leave the power of discretion up to the
cable operator; and both sections are within the degree of restrictiveness
allowed in Pacifica 47
Justice O'Connor disagreed with the determination that because
sections 10(a) and 10(c) are directed at two different classifications of cable
channels, leased access and public access, this differentiation was significant
enough to warrant different outcomes in terms of constitutionality. The
interest at stake, the protection of children, remained the same for each
section, and to Justice O'Connor this interest was significant and compelling
enough to outweigh any differences in the origins of the channels in question. 4 The fact that public access programming is usually subject to a
certain amount of policing by the manager or agency in charge was of little
significance, and was of
too speculative a nature to justify deeming section
149
unconstitutional.
10(c)

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2397.
Id.
Iad at 2403 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id.
116 S. Ct. at 2404.
Id.
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C. Justice Kennedy: Adherence to Strict Scrutiny
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Ginsberg, concurred that sections
10(b) and 10(c) are unconstitutional but disagreed with the conclusion that
section 10(a) is constitutionally valid.1 50 The primary criticism expressed by
Justice Kennedy concerned not only the plurality decision, but the method of
reasoning, or lack thereof, used to reach that conclusion. Justice Kennedy
criticized the plurality for "balking" at taking the next logical step after
determining that the sections in question constitute state action. 5' This step,
stated Justice Kennedy, is the determination of what standard is applicable to
decide if the sections are consistent with the Constitution.'5 2 According to
Justice Kennedy, the regulations in the Cable Act were attempts by government to identify certain types of speech and exclude them from a public
forum, specifically public access and leased access channels. 53 It is repugnant to the Constitution to allow any content-based discrimination against
free speech by a government body, unless that discrimination can withstand
strict scrutiny. 54 According to Justice Kennedy, none of the sections
withstand strict scrutiny, and all should be struck down by the Court.' 55
Justice Kennedy found it disturbing that the plurality declined to adopt
the strict scrutiny standard.156 Whereas Justice Breyer was reluctant to
declare a rigid formula when confronting this First Amendment issue, Justice
Kennedy claimed the utilization of a strict scrutiny test has often been used
effectively by the Court and that such a test would insure the protection of
free speech without hindering the government's efforts to address societal
problems. 57 Justice Kennedy feared the Court's reluctance to declare in
advance that the standard of judicial review will result in inequities in the
decision making process, unfairness to the petitioners and respondents who

150. Id. at 2404 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
151. Id. at 2405.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2405.
155. Id.
156. Id. Justice Kennedy defended strict scrutiny by stating: "Indeed, if strict scrutiny is
an instance of 'judicial formulae so rigid that they become a straightjacket that disables
Government from responding to serious problems,' this is a grave indictment of our First
Amendment jurisprudence, which relies on strict scrutiny in a number of settings where
context is important." Id. at 2406 (citation omitted).
157. Id. Kennedy claims that strict scrutiny ensures governmental solutions and does not
sacrifice free speech to a greater extent than is necessary to achieve a compelling goal.
Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2406.
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attempt to predict court decisions, and irregularities among similar cases
dependent upon minute changes in situation, technology, and popular
opinion. 58 The standard which the plurality ultimately adopted was whether
the Cable Act "properly addresses an extremely important problem, without
imposing, in light of the relevant interests, an unnecessarily great restriction
on speech." 159 According to Justice Kennedy, this standard represents little
more than a futile semantics game, as it is remarkably similar to the established strict scrutiny test, but does not commit to the historical language of
the latter. 60 The result is confusion and disarray within First Amendment
litigation, a result with which Justice Kennedy is dissatisfied.
In regard to section 10(c), Justice Kennedy argued that public access
channels are a public forum. Public access channels are within the definition
of "public forum" set forth by the Court in 1992. The Court has previously
held a public forum to be "property that the State has opened for expressive
activity by part or all of the public. '161 Public access channels have been
called the "electronic soapbox of the next-soon to be currentcommunication age," an indication of cable television's emerging role as an
expressive and accessible medium.' 62 Once the existence of public access
channels as a public forum had been established, it became clear to Justice
Kennedy that the public expressive activity being broadcast on those
channels may not be regulated on the
basis of content by the government
163
scrutiny.
strict
withstanding
without
The result of this scrutiny, Justice Kennedy argued, is that section 10(c)
must be declared unconstitutional.164 According to Justice Kennedy,
Congress cannot empower cable operators with editorial control over public

158. Id.
159. Id. at 2385.

160. Id. at 2406-07.
161. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678
(1992) (holding an airport terminal, operated by a public authority, is not a public forum; thus
a ban on solicitation must satisfy only a reasonableness standard). The Court further stated:
[I]ndividuals have a right to use "streets and parks for communication of
views," ... such a right flowed from the fact that "streets and parks ... have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind,
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions."
Iii at 679 (quoting Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939)).
162. Wally Mueller, Note, Controversial Programming on Cable Television's Public
Access Channels: The Limits of Governmental Response, 38 DEPAuL L. REv. 1051 (1989).

163. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2416.
164. Id.
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access channels because the nature of those channels as public forums
65
prevents the vesting of editorial rights in cable operators in the first place.'
Although a compelling interest does exist in protecting children from
indecent programming, section 10(c) is not narrowly tailored to achieve this
end. 66 Some cable operators may choose not to ban obscene programming,
thus leaving some children unprotected and failing to achieve, in full, the
prescribed goal. 67 In addition, adults will be inadvertently victimized by a
comprehensive ban. Section 10(c), therefore, 68represents too intrusive a
method to be characterized as narrowly tailored.
Justice Kennedy began his analysis of section 10(a) by drawing an
analogy between cable television programming and indecent telephone
communication, as explored in Sable. 69 Justice Kennedy asserted that the
strict scrutiny which applied to laws prohibiting a common carrier from
transmitting phone sex over the telephone wires should also be applied to
obscene cable programming. 70 Whereas the former was an attempt by
Congress to preclude the transmission of protected speech, section 10(a) is
an attempt by Congress to permit a carrier to ban certain forms of speech.
Justice Kennedy further stated that the access rules plainly impose common
carrier obligations on cable operators, noting that common carriers serve
much the same function as a public forum and are deserving of the same
level of protection. 17 ' This is because each strives7 2 to ensure a means of
communication free from restriction and censorship.
The analogy between common carriers and public forums formed the
foundation for Justice Kennedy's analysis, a foundation which he berates the
plurality for refusing to acknowledge:
The plurality acknowledges content-based exclusions from the
right to use a common carrier could violate the First Amendment.
It tells us, however, that it is wary of analogies to doctrines developed elsewhere, and so does not address this issue. This newfound

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
(1989)).
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2416.
Id. at 2412 (citing Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131
Id.
Id.
Id.
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aversion 17to3 analogical reasoning strikes at a process basic to legal
analysis.
If the plurality were to apply an analysis based on comparing public forums
to common carriers, it would find content-based restrictions on public forum
expressions have been permitted, but only when those restrictions were
necessary to achieve a specific institutional goal. 74 This limitation on the
ability to restrict public forums assures the people that a legitimate purpose
exists for the limitation and inhibits arbitrary and unjustified restrictions by
government. 17 The restrictions imposed by section 10(a) warrant strict
scrutiny, as it is an attempt by government to inhibit forms of expression it
feels are indecent and unnecessary. 176 Justice Kennedy stated that section
10(a) does not represent a sufficient governmental interest, that of restoring
editorial discretion over
leased access channels to cable operators, to warrant
177
upholding this statute.

In addition to faulting the plurality for failing to adopt a strict scrutiny
standard when evaluating the constitutionality of these sections, Justice
Kennedy further disagreed with the conclusion reached by the plurality. 178
Among the reasons for finding section 10(c) constitutional, the plurality
noted the tendency of public access channels to be "subject to complex
supervisory systems of various sorts, often with both public and private
elements."' 179 Justice Kennedy questioned the effectiveness, if not the
existence, of these safeguards in public access channels, noting that "[m]ost
access centers surveyed do not prescreen at all, except, as in [two named
localities], a high speed run-through for technical quality.' 80
Although Justice Kennedy doubted the validity of these claims, the fact
that the plurality relied upon these facts indicates an even greater flaw in the
plurality's reasoning concerning section 10(a). Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the policies, if indeed inherent in public access programming,
would withstand strict scrutiny as they are narrowly tailored to protect
children from indecent programming.' 8' Such a system, if implemented in

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2413.
Id.
Id. at 2414.
IU.
Id. at 2416.
Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2417.
IaM at 2394.
Id. at 2417 (citation omitted).
Id.
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leased access channel programming, would achieve the same goal, and thus
serve the same compelling interest, and constitute a less intrusive measure of
policing than that presented in section 10(a). 82 Given this less intrusive and
more narrowly tailored means, Justice
Kennedy concluded that section 10(a)
8 3
should be declared unconstitutional.1
D. Justice Thomas: Supporting the Cable Operators
Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rhenquist and Justice Scalia,
agreed with the plurality's finding that section 10(a) is constitutionally valid,
but disagreed with the conclusion that the remaining two sections, 10(b) and
10(c), are constitutionally invalid. 8 4 Justice Thomas, like Justice Kennedy,
disparaged the plurality for refusing to declare a definite standard by which
to judge the First Amendment validity of the sections in question. The Court
has attempted to declare such a standard in previous cases, and Justice
Breyer's refusal disregarded the reasoning of that previous declaration.
Justice Thomas further discounted the standard adopted by Justice Breyer as
"heretofore unknown" and "facially subjective" and faulted this standard for
inviting a "balancing of asserted speech interests to a degree not ordinarily
permitted."'' 8 5 Justice Thomas also expressed a need for adherence to
precedents, precedents which were not of8 6his making but must, nonetheless,
provide form and focus for current cases.1
Justice Thomas began his opinion regarding the substance of the statute
by noting the distinctions between the print, broadcast, and cable television
media that the Court has made in previous decisions. 187 Justice Thomas
noted that the level of government control that has been exercised over
broadcasting has been struck down as unconstitutional when attempted to be
exercised over newspaper reporting.188 This discrepancy has placed "cable
in a doctrinal wasteland in which regulators and cable operators alike could
not be sure whether cable was entitled to the substantial First Amendment
protections afforded the print media or was subject to the more onerous
obligations shouldered by the broadcast media."'' 8 9 However, Justice

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2417.
Id. at 2419 (Thomas, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2422.
Id.
Id. at 2419.
Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2419.
Id. at 2420.
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Thomas recognized a trend in recent decisions towards affording cable
19
same protections as those enjoyed by print and non-broadcast media. 0
Based on this principle of higher scrutiny for cable operators, Justice
Thomas further discounted the petitioners' claims that their rights have been
infringed upon by the Act. The petitioners have to realize, stated Justice
Thomas: "IT]hat cable access is not a constitutionally required entitlement
and that the right they claim to leased and public access has, by definition,
been governmentally created at the expense of cable operators' editorial
discretion."'1 9' The provisions, therefore, restrict the exercise of free speech
by cable
by cable operators and actually expand the exercise of free 1speech
92
programmers who have no constitutional right to speak here.
A First Amendment challenge must be made by the party whose
constitutionally protected free speech has been circumvented.' 93 Justice
Thomas felt it is the cable operator, and not the access programmer, whose
freedom of speech has been inhibited by these sections.' 94 Justice Thomas
stated the "constitutional presumption properly runs in favor of the operators' editorial discretion, and that discretion may not be burdened without a
compelling reason for doing so."' 195 Justice Thomas determined that sections
10(a) and 10(c) are not infringements upon the programmers' ability to
freely speak, but are instead restorations of the editorial discretion cable
operators would have had but for government regulations that required them
to allow leased and public access programmers to program at their pleasure. 196 Justice Thomas further noted that cable operators have retained the
right to exercise editorial control over both types of channels, although
historically, they have not done so with public access channels. 197 The

190. Id. (citing Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); Leathers v.
Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991); FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979)).
191. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2424.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 2425. The "gist of the question of standing" is whether the party seeking relief
has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
204 (1962).
194. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2425.
195. Id. at 2424.

196. Id.
197. Id. at 2425. Justice Thomas faults the plurality for mistaking the inability to exercise
a right for the absence of the right altogether. Although cable operators have not historically
exercised their editorial control, that absence does not diminish the operator's power to do so.
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petitioners in these cases, concluded Justice Thomas, cannot reasonably
request the Court to strictly scrutinize the statutes in question in such a
while maximizing the
manner that diminishes the cable operator's
98 discretion
programmer's ability to program at will.'
Justice Thomas rejected the argument that section 10(c) is invalid
because it imposes a content-based restriction on the right to speak in a
public forum, specifically public access channels.199 Cable systems, noted
Justice Thomas, are not public property but rather are privately owned and
managed entities."z° Furthermore, the additional obligations imposed on the
private cable operators, i.e., access scheduling and production assistance,
characterize public access channels as very different from traditional public
fora, effectively rebutting any claim made by the petitioners that public
access channels might be considered a public forum.20' As such, the public
forum doctrine governs access only to private property and does not extend
to property, such as public access channels, that is outside the scope of
governmental control. Sections 10(a) and 10(c), therefore, were both
deemed constitutionally valid by Justice Thomas.20 2
Analyzing section 10(b), Justice Thomas believed it must be subject to
strict scrutiny, as the section places a content-based restriction on private
speech programming by requiring cable operators to segregate and block
indecent programming. 2°3 Justice Thomas asserted that the government may
reinforce parental authority to guide the moral and spiritual well-being of
their children. 20 4 The alternatives which the plurality asserts are as equally

198. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2425.
199. Id. at 2426.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2428.
202. Id. at 2432.
203. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2429.
204. Id. As examples of parental reinforcement, Justice Thomas cited Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), which prohibited the sale of indecent literature to minors and
imposed default rules intended to protect children from telephone pornography. Id. at 639.
The Ginsberg Court noted:
The well-being of its children is of course a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate, and, in our view, two interests justify the limitations
in [the statute challenged] upon the availability of sex material to minors under
17, at least if it was rational for the legislature to find that the minors' exposure
to such material might be harmful. First of all, constitutional interpretation has
consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society.
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effective as section 10(b) in protecting children, i.e., lock boxes and V-chips,
are not adequate alternatives and do not support parental authority as
effectively as the section in question. 2 5 Questionable programs are likely to
be shown with little or no warning. This attribute of television programming
makes it virtually impossible for a parent to supervise and adjust such
devices in accordance with indecent programming.
The plurality further struck down section 10(b) for fear that the written
requests necessary for the cable subscriber to gain access to indecent
programming will result in societal stigma, and a subsequent reluctance for
viewers to subscribe to previously available programming. 20
Justice
Thomas questioned this assumption, as the text of section 10(b) does not
mention the creation or governing of such a list.207 Justice Thomas believed
this to be an unsupported assumption, one which attributed to section 10(b)
evils which it did not possess. The requirement of a written rather than oral
request for access to blocked channels has advantages as well, i.e., preventing fraudulent attempts on the part of minors to gain access to channels
deemed unsuited for children by their parents. 20s
VI. CONCLUSION
A. Keeping an Eye on the Future
The division within the Supreme Court in deciding Denver illustrates
the complexity and the importance of this issue. Denver concerns not only
cable television viewing, but also addresses the ability of the government to
intrude into the private lives of American citizens. Justice Breyer, writing
the plurality opinion, expressed reluctance in applying previous decisions
and tests to an area of communications that is constantly changing such as
cable television. 2°9 Other Justices, however, comfortably rely on precedent
and established levels of scrutiny in making their own determinations as to
the constitutionality of these regulations. 210 The difference between these

205.
206.
207.
208.

Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2429.
Id. at 2392.
Id at 2430.
Id.

209. Id. at 2385. Justice Breyer stated that "aware as we are of the changes taking place
in the law, the technology, and the industrial structure, related to telecommunications, we
believe it unwise and unnecessary definitively to pick one analogy or one specific set of words
now." Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2385 (citations omitted).
210. See id. at 2404 (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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methods of reasoning indicates the difficulty of weighing two very important
interests: the protection of children from sexually explicit communications
and the protection of First Amendment rights coveted by American citizens.
Justice Breyer avoided the difficulty of addressing this unique case with preexisting precedent by creating his own constitutionality test.2 11 This method,
no doubt, seemed appropriate to Justice Breyer because no medium is as
pervasive or as diverse as cable television. 1 2 Other Justices, however,
believed that precedent must be followed to assure just rulings in accordance
with established doctrine. 1 3
As technology continues to evolve, however, new problems will
certainly arise as to what may or may not be communicated over new media.
For instance, the relatively new forum of cyberspace will most likely become
an area of concern. One author has commented that "[w]hile cyberspace
offers great educational opportunities for child and adult users alike, the
minimal effort needed to gain access to cyberspace haunts those Americans
concerned about the availability and accessibility of cybersmut to children. 21 4 With this new issue on the horizon, it is impossible to predict how
it will be resolved given the plurality's recent aversion to established
principles.
Furthermore, the American public deserves to know on what grounds
their constitutional arguments will be evaluated, a point raised by Justice
Kennedy.1 Justice Breyer, no doubt, considered his analysis innovative and
flexible, attempting to do justice to all media by recognizing the uniqueness
of the cable communication forum.2 16 In fact, the plurality has decided this
issue in a vacuum, seriously debilitating the impact this decision will have
on future First Amendment litigation.

211. Id. at 2385. This test was articulated by Justice Breyer as follows: "[W]e can decide
this case more narrowly, by closely scrutinizing § 10(a) to assure that it properly addresses an
extremely important problem, without imposing, in light of relevant interests, an unnecessarily
great restriction on speech." Id.
212. Il at 2385-86.
213. Denver, 116 S. CL at 2406. Justice Kennedy stated that "[s]tandards are the means
by which we state in advance how to test a law's validity, rather than letting the height of the
bar be determined by the apparent exigencies of the day." Id.
214. Debra D. Burke, Note, Cybersmut and the First Amendment: A Call for a New
Obscenity Standard,9 HARV. J.L. & tCH. 87, 94 (1992).
215. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2406.
216. Id. at 2385.
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B. The Benefits of ParentalAuthority
The protection of children is a compelling interest, indeed.2 17 In
upholding regulations which seek to protect children, however, the Court
runs the risk of diminishing the availability of materials to such an extent
that adults will be reduced to watching only those programs which are fit for
children. One commentator has noted:
Solicitude for children, then, justifies neither the regulation of indecency on television nor different regulation for broadcasting and
cable. Such regulation inevitably abridges adults' first amendment
rights, improperly usurps a discretionary parental function with
broad governmental fiat, and ignores less restrictive means
to pro218
tect children equally available in broadcasting and cable.
The passage of the Cable Act was an attempt by Congress to protect children.2 19 Yet during all of the proceedings concerning this Act, both legislative and judicial, very little consideration was given to the parents. Certainly
parents are charged with the physical and psychological safety of their
children. The Cable Act is an effort to usurp this function and replace the
traditional role of parenting with government mandates. The power of
effective parenting has been described by one author:
In the home ... parents are in a better position to make individualized judgments regarding household viewing habits of both sexual
material and graphic violence. The Supreme Court long has deferred to a parent's right to control the development and upbringing
of his children. Thus, parental control is not only the most effective method, but the most protective of first amendment rights. 2
The plurality virtually ignored the role of parents in deciding this issue,
apparently assuming parents are either unwilling or unable to supervise their
children. While the Breyer Group questioned the effectiveness of current
technological devices that may limit television viewing by children, the

217. See, e.g., Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
218. Laurence H. Winer, Note, The Signal Cable Sends, PartII - Interference from the
Indecency Cases, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 459, 521 (1987).
219. 138 CONG. REc. S645 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992). The stated purpose for the Act is
"[t]o protect children from indecent cable programming on leased access channels." Id.
220. Jay A. Gayoso, Note, The FCC'sRegulation of BroadcastIndecency: A Broadened
ApproachforRemoving Immoralityfrom the Airwaves, 43 U. MIAMI L. RaV. 871, 911 (1989).
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combination of parenting and technology may provide the answer. One
author articulated the potential of coupling present technology with effective
parenting in addressing this problem with:
When children are unsupervised, program guides and the electronic
technology available for both cable and broadcasting can provide
the desired control. Indeed, the availability of a simple lock to
prevent all unsupervised television watching, even without more refined technology, should be an adequate, less restrictive means of
control sufficient to preclude any broader government regulation . '
It would be naive to assume that every child is continually supervised by his
or her parents. The economic and domestic situation of most American
families precludes this possibility. Certainly, however, this should be a
consideration when weighing the interest of society in protecting children
from inadvertent exposure to indecent programming against another interest
as compelling as free speech. In upholding section 10(a) of the Cable Act,
the plurality has infringed upon the rights of adult viewers to watch what
they want on cable television. Although this measure seems the least severe
alternative to Justice Breyer, it is an infringement nonetheless. The plurality
has overlooked the most effective protective measure, however, the measure
that comes at no cost to every person. The plurality has overlooked the
responsible parents.
ChristopherD. Ritchie

221. Winer, supra note 218, at 522-23.
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